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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
William Barnes )    Docket No.  2018-05-1127 
 ) 
v. ) State File No. 53470-2018 
 )     
Jack Cooper Transport Co., et al. )     
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )  Heard March 24, 2020, at Knoxville 
Compensation Claims ) 
Dale A. Tipps, Judge )
  
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, the employee reported that his left knee gave way while he 
was climbing a ladder at work.  The employee had suffered a work-related injury to his 
left knee several years before when his employer had workers’ compensation coverage 
with a different insurer.  The employee also had been diagnosed with pre-existing 
osteoarthritis in his left knee unrelated to his work injuries.  One physician testified that 
the employee’s current need for a total knee arthroplasty was caused primarily by his pre-
existing osteoarthritis.  Another physician opined that the most recent work accident 
caused an exacerbation of his pre-existing osteoarthritis.  The trial court concluded the 
employee is likely to prevail at trial in proving the need for a total knee arthroplasty arose 
primarily from the most recent work accident, and it ordered the employer to authorize 
treatment, including any recommended surgery.  The employer and its current insurer 
have appealed.  We affirm the trial court’s decision to the extent it orders the employer to 
provide reasonable and necessary medical benefits causally related to the most recent 
work injury.  However, we reverse the trial court’s order compelling the employer and its 
current insurer to authorize the total knee arthroplasty, and we remand the case. 
 
Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which 
Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.   
 
A. Allen Grant, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jack Cooper Transport Co. and 
National Interstate Ins. Co.  
 
Richard L. Dugger, Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, William Barnes 
 
Sara E. Barnett, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Continental Indemnity Co. 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 William Barnes (“Employee”), a fifty-year-old resident of Marshall County, 
Tennessee, worked for Jack Cooper Transport (“Employer”) as a truck driver for 
approximately twenty-four years.  It is undisputed that Employee had experienced 
problems with his left knee since at least 1998, when he complained of “some popping in 
his knee.”  In 2007, Employee complained of pain in his left knee after bumping it 
against a truck rail.  In 2011, a physician noted “mild activity in the medial left knee” that 
was “most likely . . . related to degenerative joint disease.” 
 
In February 2013, Employee was climbing a ladder on the side of a transport truck 
when he felt a pop and pain in his left knee.  The accident was treated as compensable, 
and his benefits were paid by Employer’s insurer at the time, Continental Indemnity 
Company (“Continental”).  Employee was diagnosed with a medial meniscal tear with 
underlying degenerative changes, and he underwent surgical repair in June 2013.  The 
treating physician at that time, Dr. Jason Haslam, concluded the medial meniscal tear was 
causally related to the work accident but that Employee’s underlying degenerative 
changes were pre-existing and not related to the work accident.  Employee’s claim for 
workers’ compensation benefits was settled in February 2014, and his right to causally-
related future medical benefits remained open. 
 
 Following his 2013 work injury, Employee returned to work for Employer.  He 
had been released to work by Dr. Haslam without restrictions.  He returned to the same 
job performing the same tasks as before the 2013 accident.  He denied having any 
problems after returning to work until mid-2018.  On July 10, 2018, Employee reported 
another incident while climbing a ladder to secure vehicles to a trailer for transport.  
Employee explained that as he neared the top of the ladder, his left knee “gave out and 
collapsed.”  He was able to finish tying down the vehicles, and he made his delivery. 
However, he claimed that operating the clutch in his truck increased the symptoms in his 
left knee.  After completing his delivery, Employee reported the incident to Employer. 
 
 Employee was first seen at a Concentra facility where he was diagnosed with a left 
knee strain.  He was referred for two weeks of physical therapy and was released to 
return to work with restrictions.  A July 25, 2018 MRI was interpreted as showing a strain 
of the anterior cruciate ligament, and Employee was referred to an orthopedic specialist.  
Thereafter, Employer provided a panel of orthopedic specialists, and Employee selected a 
physician.  However, the physician Employee selected declined to evaluate or treat him.  
As a result, Employee was instructed to select from the remaining two physicians.  He 
requested another physician to replace his original selection on the panel but was not 
provided a third option.  He then selected Dr. Blake Garside, an orthopedic surgeon. 
 
 In his September 5, 2018 report, Dr. Garside reviewed Employee’s reported 
history of left knee problems and his description of the most recent work accident.  Dr. 
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Garside noted the July 25 MRI, which he described as revealing “interval worsening and 
progression of the degenerative change, most pronounced in his medial and 
patellofemoral compartments.”  Dr. Garside concluded Employee “appears to have 
exacerbated his pre-existing left knee osteoarthritis.”  He prescribed anti-inflammatory 
medication and recommended a knee injection, which he administered at that visit.  Dr. 
Garside discussed the possibility of a total knee replacement, which he explained “would 
be a procedure performed for his pre-existing left knee osteoarthritis.” 
 
 In the report of Employee’s second visit on October 3, 2018, Dr. Garside 
expounded on his causation opinions as follows: 
 
He has worked in the same position for 23 years.  His current symptoms in 
my opinion represent exacerbation of his pre-existing osteoarthritis.  If the 
history provided by [Employee] is correct, it is likely that his current 
osteoarthritis represented posttraumatic osteoarthritis from his previous 
work injuries.  I do not have any of his previous records available for our 
review. 
 
 As a result of the opinions expressed by Dr. Garside, Employer and its current 
insurer, National Interstate Insurance Company (“National”), denied Employee’s request 
for authorization of the total knee replacement.  It asserted Employee’s need for the 
surgery did not arise primarily from the 2018 work accident but was related to 
Employee’s pre-existing osteoarthritis.  Thereafter, Employer sent Dr. Garside a request 
to review records from Employee’s prior left knee treatment.  In an April 1, 2019 letter to 
Employer’s counsel, Dr. Garside opined as follows: 
 
In my opinion, the last incident of July 10, 2018, did not contribute more 
than 50% in causing the need for [Employee] to undergo a total knee 
arthroplasty and the July 10, 2018[] incident did not contribute more than 
50% in causing his current left knee issues, which are related to preexisting 
left knee osteoarthritis. 
 
 In December 2018, Employee sought treatment on his own at Seven Springs 
Orthopaedic & Sports Medicine, the same practice where he had treated in 2013.  In a 
December 5, 2018 report, the providers are listed as Brian Masterson, PA-C and Brant 
Bell, PA-C; however, the end of the record bears the names Jason Jones, M.D., Joe 
Wieck, M.D., and Jim Renfro, M.D.1  In a subsequent report dated September 16, 2019, 
the provider is listed as Brian Masterson, PA-C, but the end of the report bears the name 
Jason Jones, M.D.  In this report, the provider stated as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 The physicians’ names are typed at the end of the report, but there is no signature or anything to 
designate an official electronic signature. 
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The patient hurt his knee while working on July 10, 2018.  He had an 
exacerbation of pre-existing arthritis and sought our care on December 5, 
2018.  His attorney has sent us a letter inquiring about this being a new 
injury or previous injury.  In my medical opinion, I believe this is a new 
injury that exacerbated a pre-existing condition.  It is hard to determine the 
extent of the injury.  However, he was previously doing well by his report 
up until re-injury. 
 
 Thereafter, on November 4, 2019, Dr. Jones issued a letter that bears his signature.  
In it, he described both the 2013 and the 2018 work accidents.  He then opined: 
 
It is my opinion the second injury is the cause of his ongoing pain despite 
having underlying osteoarthritis since the first injury[,] which was remedied 
surgically.  He ultimately needs a total knee arthroplasty and I would agree 
with Dr. Garson [sic] on his treatment plan.  He clearly is in need of 
surgical intervention and will likely not get sustained relief from 
conservative measures.  At this point, I believe his second injury is the 
cause of his ongoing pain, which was an exacerbation of osteoarthritis. 
 
 Employee filed a request for an expedited hearing, asking the trial court to order 
Employer to authorize medical treatment including the total knee arthroplasty.  Attorneys 
for both National and Continental appeared and argued their clients’ respective 
positions.2  Thereafter, the trial court determined Employee was likely to prevail at trial 
in showing that the most recent work accident caused a compensable aggravation of his 
pre-existing left knee condition, and that Dr. Jones’s causation opinion was “more 
persuasive.”  As a result, it ordered Employer to provide “medical treatment made 
reasonably necessary by [Employee’s] July 10, 2018 injury, including any recommended 
surgery.”  Employer and National have appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2019).  When the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.  Madden v. Holland 
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).  However, “[n]o similar 
                                                 
2 The hearing transcript indicates that one attorney appeared on behalf of Employer and National, and 
another attorney appeared on behalf of Continental.  Although a motion to dismiss Continental was 
pending at the time of the expedited hearing, the trial court stated it would not address that motion as part 
of the expedited hearing.  Employee’s counsel advised the court that Employee had no objection to 
Continental’s counsel participating in the expedited hearing.  Counsel for Employer and National did not 
object to Continental’s counsel participating in the hearing. 
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deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”  
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at 
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018).  Similarly, the interpretation and 
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with 
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions.  See Mansell v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013).  We are 
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a 
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2019). 
 
Analysis 
 
 Employer identified three issues on appeal, which we combine and restate as 
follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in determining the panel of physicians offered to 
Employee was invalid; and (2) whether the trial court erred in accepting Dr. Jones’s 
opinions over those of Dr. Garside and in concluding Employee is likely to prevail at trial 
in proving the need for a total knee replacement arose primarily from the July 10, 2018 
work injury. 
 
Selection of Panel Physician/Presumption of Correctness 
 
When a work injury is reported, an employer is required to “designate a group of 
three (3) or more independent reputable physicians . . . if available in the injured 
employee’s community or, if not so available, in accordance with subdivision (a)(3)(B), 
from which the injured employee shall select one (1) to be the treating physician.”  Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2019).  Further, the law specifically addresses the 
situation in which a selected physician declines to accept the employee as a patient: 
 
If any physician . . . included on a panel provided to an employee under this 
subsection declines to accept the employee as a patient for the purpose of 
providing treatment to the employee for his workers’ compensation injury, 
the employee may either select a physician from the remaining  
physicians . . . included on the initial panel . . . or request that the employer 
provide an additional choice . . . to replace the physician . . . who refused to 
accept the injured employee as a patient for the purpose of treating the 
employee’s workers’ compensation injury. 
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(G).  Thus, the law is clear that it is the employee, not 
the employer, who has the option of requesting a replacement physician on a panel under 
circumstances where the physician originally selected declines to accept the employee as 
a patient.  Here, Employer initially provided Employee with a proper panel, but the 
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doctor Employee selected declined to accept Employee as a patient.  At the expedited 
hearing, Employee testified as follows: 
 
Q: Okay.  Did the insurance carrier at that time give you a panel? 
 
A: They sent me down – the insurance company sent me a panel of 
three doctors. . . . And I picked Dr. Moore.  And then I think it was 
two days prior . . . they e-mailed us back and said, you need to pick 
another doctor because Dr. Moore will not take your case.  So we 
already reviewed all three of the doctors on panel, and we liked Dr. 
Moore because of the reviews he got.  And so I asked the insurance 
company, I said, Hey, I need to get another pick.  I e-mailed her 
back, and I said, I’d like to have another doctor added since you took 
one away.  And she said, we already gave you a panel of three; you 
have to pick now.  So we picked Dr. Garside. 
 
Q: Okay.  So they took the one you picked away and told you [that] you 
had to pick from the two? 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Employer does not dispute that Employee was not offered a third option after the 
original physician declined to accept Employee as a patient.  Instead, Employer argues 
that, while there were ultimately only two physicians on the panel, Employee 
nevertheless made a selection from the panel.  Therefore, according to Employer, the 
selected physician should be deemed the authorized treating physician whose causation 
opinion is entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-102(14)(E) (2019).  We disagree.  Instead, we conclude Employer’s panel 
was rendered defective by its unwillingness to offer a replacement physician when 
requested to do so by Employee under the circumstances presented in this case.  As a 
result, Dr. Garside, although designated by Employer as an authorized treating physician, 
was not selected from a valid panel pursuant to section 50-6-204(a)(3), and his causation 
opinion is not entitled to a presumption of correctness as described in section 50-6-
102(14)(E). 
 
Expert Medical Opinions and Evidence of Causation 
 
 We have previously addressed the analysis of claims hinging on an alleged 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition as follows: 
 
Determining the compensability of an alleged work-related aggravation of a 
preexisting, degenerative medical condition has long been a source of 
difficulty under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law.  The general 
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assembly has, in recent years, sought to clarify this issue through statutory 
amendments. 
 
. . . . 
 
[A]s part of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act, the general 
assembly . . . amended the definition of “injury”: 
 
“Injury” and “personal injury” mean an injury by  
accident, . . . or cumulative trauma conditions . . . arising 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, 
that causes death, disablement, or the need for medical 
treatment of the employee; provided that: 
 
(A) An injury . . . shall not include the aggravation of a 
preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can be 
shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
aggravation arose primarily out of and in the course and 
scope of employment. 
  
Miller v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., No. 2015-05-0518, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. 
LEXIS 40, at *7-9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 21, 2015) (quoting Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (emphasis added)).  We concluded in Miller that “an employee can 
satisfy the burden of proving a compensable aggravation if: (1) there is expert medical 
proof that the work accident contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the 
aggravation, and (2) the work accident was the cause of the aggravation more likely than 
not considering all causes.”  Id. at *13.  In addition, when the dispute centers on a request 
for medical treatment, the burden at an expedited hearing is on the employee to show he 
or she is likely to prevail at trial in proving that the work injury “contributed more than 
fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . need for medical treatment, considering all causes.”  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C). 
 
Moreover, in Miller, we addressed the definitions of the terms “aggravation” and 
“exacerbation” in a medical context.  Id. at *14-15.  We noted that although the American 
Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment defines those 
terms differently, the General Assembly did not adopt or acknowledge those definitions 
in Tennessee’s workers’ compensation statutes.  Id. at *15.  We also noted that 
physicians often use those terms interchangeably.  Id.  Therefore, when analyzing 
medical evidence, we conclude it is necessary to consider the relevant medical records 
and expert opinions in their entirety in an effort to understand the intended meaning of 
those terms as used by any particular physician. 
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 It is well-established that, when faced with competing expert medical opinions, 
“trial courts are granted broad discretion in choosing which opinion to accept, and we 
will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion.”  Jimenez v. Xclusive Staffing 
of Tenn., LLC, No. 2016-06-2377, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 45, at *6 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2017).  A trial court abuses its discretion when 
it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect 
legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its 
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.  State v. Ostein, 293 S.W.3d 
519, 526 (Tenn. 2009); Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 
S.W.3d 348, 358 (Tenn. 2008); Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 42 (Tenn. 2005).  Moreover, we are charged with reviewing 
deposition testimony and documentary evidence de novo.  See Brees v. Escape Day Spa 
& Salon, No. 2014-06-0072, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 5, at *16 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 12, 2015) (“[T]he trial court occupies no better position 
than this Appeals Board in reviewing and interpreting documentary evidence.”).  Also, 
when the trial court’s determination is challenged on appeal, we must determine where 
the preponderance of the evidence lies.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7). 
 
 In the present case, the authorized treating physician, Dr. Garside, concluded that 
Employee’s need for a total knee arthroplasty arose primarily from his pre-existing 
osteoarthritis.  More precisely, Dr. Garside stated: 
 
In my opinion, the last incident of July 10, 2018, did not contribute more 
than 50% in causing the need for [Employee] to undergo a total knee 
arthroplasty and the July 10, 2018[] incident did not contribute more than 
50% in causing his current left knee issues, which are related to preexisting 
left knee osteoarthritis. 
 
Although we have concluded Dr. Garside’s opinion was not entitled to a presumption of 
correctness, we note that his opinion is unequivocal and must be weighed against other 
expert opinions offered during the expedited hearing. 
 
 In comparison, the expert opinions offered by Employee in support of his position 
are problematic.  First, it is unclear from the medical records of Seven Springs 
Orthopaedics whether a physician was actually expressing the medical opinions 
contained in those records.  The providers were identified as physician’s assistants.3  
There is no indication in the medical records that a physician independently expressed or 
adopted the opinions contained in those records.  Indeed, Employee was unable to testify 
definitively whether he actually saw a physician during his visits at that practice.   
                                                 
3 A physician’s assistant, like a nurse practitioner, is not qualified under our laws to offer an expert 
opinion on medical causation.  See Adiole v. Logan Senior Care, LLC, No. 2018-06-0451, 2019 TN Wrk.  
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 78, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 16, 2019). 
9 
 
Second, the one document produced by Employee that was signed by a physician, 
Dr. Jones’s November 4, 2019 letter, did not contain an unequivocal opinion supporting 
Employee’s claim.  Instead, Dr. Jones opined that the most recent work accident was “the 
cause of his ongoing pain.”  He described the incident as causing an “exacerbation of 
osteoarthritis” and agreed a total knee arthroplasty was needed.  However, he neither 
opined that the exacerbation of Employee’s pre-existing osteoarthritis was the primary 
cause of the need for the total knee arthroplasty, considering all causes, nor did he use 
words to that effect.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C). 
 
 It is well-settled that in cases where the employee alleges an aggravation of a pre-
existing condition, evidence of a mere increase in pain caused by a work accident, with 
no accompanying evidence that the work accident advanced the severity of the pre-
existing condition or caused an anatomic change in that condition, is insufficient to 
support a finding of compensability.  See, e.g., Berdnick v. Fairfield Glade Comm’y Club, 
No. 2016-04-0328, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 32, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ 
Comp. App. Bd. May 18, 2017); Fly v. Travelers Ins., No. W2011-01215-WC-WCM-
WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 642, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sept. 20, 2012).  
Furthermore, in order for pain to constitute a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition, there must be evidence that the pain itself was disabling.  See Hill v. Eagle 
Bend Mfg., 942 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tenn. 1997). 
 
 In the present case, Employee’s expert, Dr. Jones, opined that the most recent 
work accident was the cause of Employee’s ongoing pain and exacerbated his pre-
existing osteoarthritis.  But there is no opinion from Dr. Jones that the exacerbation 
advanced Employee’s pre-existing osteoarthritis, that the work accident caused an 
anatomic change in his pre-existing condition, or that the pain Dr. Jones described was, 
itself, disabling.  There is also no evidence that the need for a total knee arthroplasty 
arose primarily from the most recent work accident when all causes were considered.  
Moreover, the record contains no evidence as to: (1) whether Dr. Jones ever examined 
Employee; (2) whether Dr. Jones supervised the examinations of Employee performed by 
the physician’s assistants; (3) whether Dr. Jones adopted the findings and opinions 
expressed by the physician’s assistants in the medical records; or (4) even whether Dr. 
Jones is, in fact, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. 
  
By contrast, Dr. Garside testified unequivocally that the most recent work accident 
was not the primary cause of the need for a total knee arthroplasty.  It is undisputed that 
Dr. Garside examined Employee on two occasions, and Dr. Garside’s deposition 
testimony makes clear that he is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon who specializes in 
the treatment of knees and shoulders and who performs seventy-five to one hundred knee 
replacements each year.  Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the 
preponderance of the medical evidence supports the trial court’s decision to credit the 
opinions of Dr. Jones over those of Dr. Garside.  In addition, we conclude the trial court’s 
decision to rely on Dr. Jones’s opinions was an abuse of discretion under these 
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circumstances because its decision was based on a “clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence,” Ostein, 293 S.W.3d at 526, causing an injustice to Employer. 
 
Finally, the trial court relied heavily on Employee’s lay testimony indicating that 
he suffered from none of his current left knee symptoms before the July 10, 2018 
accident.  The court concluded this testimony was persuasive and credible.  While we 
agree an employee’s lay testimony is relevant and material to the issue of medical 
causation, it is not enough to support an order for medical benefits in the absence of 
corroborating expert proof.   Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-0055, 2015 
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 18, 
2015).  For the reasons discussed above, we conclude the trial court erred in concluding 
Employee’s lay testimony and the opinions expressed by Dr. Jones outweighed the 
unequivocal testimony of Dr. Garside with respect to the need for a total knee 
replacement surgery. 
 
 Before concluding, we note that, in its expedited hearing order, the trial court 
ordered Employer to provide Employee “with medical treatment made reasonably 
necessary by his July 10, 2018 injury, including any recommended surgery.”  (Emphasis 
added).  The court then stated, “Dr. Garside shall continue as the authorized treating 
physician.”  As discussed above, we believe the trial court erred in accepting the 
causation opinion of Dr. Jones over that of Dr. Garside.  On the other hand, we agree 
Employee is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment causally related to 
the July 10, 2018 work accident.  However, the evidence presented at the expedited 
hearing does not support an order compelling Employer and its current insurer to 
authorize the total knee arthroplasty at this time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to the extent it 
orders Employer and National to provide reasonable and necessary medical care causally 
related to the most recent work accident, but we reverse the trial court’s order to the 
extent it compels Employer and National to authorize the total knee arthroplasty.  The 
case is remanded and costs are taxed to Employer. 
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